A Joint Submission by Adam Todd and The Australian Root Server Confederation and AHNET on the Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses; Proposed Rule as outlined in the Federal Register: February 20, 1998 (Volume 63, Number 34) Proposed Rules Page 8825-8833 Produced by Adam and Suzanne Todd on 20 March 1998. Correspondence may be directed to: Adam Todd PO BOX 174 Roseville NSW 2069 Australia Phone +61 2 9729 0565 Fax +62 2 9279 0156 email at@ah.net Introduction A summary of Mr. Todd’s professional activities, past and present, can be found at http://adamtodd.ah.net. AURSC (Australian Root Server Confederation) is an organisation that is independently run and founded by Mr. Todd with input and direction offered by AURSC users and Members. This process allows AURSC to be operated daily by a person with credibility and the skills, whilst calling directly upon the users for comments and future direction. Members include Legal, Accounting, professional, ISPs and users. AURSC is not affiliated with any other like organisation. AURSC has endeavoured to reach cooperative operational agreements with all parties in the Domain Name debate, and has only reached synchronisation agreement with AlterNIC to date. AURSC can be found at http://www.aursc.ah.net or http://www.aursc.aus AHNET is a consulting and research organisation founded by Mr. Todd and Ms. Suzanne Brook to encourage growth and development of the Internet and to develop a path for young people to enter the industry. AHNET can be found at http://www.ah.net Purpose It is the purpose of this document to address relevant sections of the Green Paper and provide recommendations. This document proposes ways in which existing commercial players will be able to maintain their existing investment and infrastructure, yet enable a fair entry into the market by the known and recognised players. Comments by Mr. Todd are in plain text. Each line from the original document is stated it it’s entirety as presented. Comments from the document are in indented Italics with a vertical bar on the left hand side. | like this Sections in bold highlight specific areas to which a response is provided. | a very specific section. Response to the “Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses; Proposed Rule” | “SUMMARY: This document sets forth ways to improve technical management | of the Internet Domain Name System (DNS). Specifically, it describes | the process by which the Federal government will transfer management of” The term “will” seems inappropriate. It appears more from the reading of this document that the US government is now considering encouraging the establishment of a long overdue process to assist in the administration in a commercial manner with community interest of the domain name space. Perhaps the term should have been “might”. | C. Operation of the Root Server System | | “ The root server system contains authoritative databases listing the | TLDs so that an Internet message can be routed to its destination.” The clause “an Internet message can be routed to its destination” should really read “domain names can be translated to IP addresses. | “Currently, NSI operates the ``A'' root server, which maintains the | authoritative root database and replicates changes to the other root” In reality NSI operates within only one set of authoritative root servers. There are other root server organisations mostly created in a community manner to ensure that domain name space based on TLDs will competitive and fairly administered. Two good examples of two root server networks currently synchronised are the AURSC (http://www.aursc.ah.net) and AlterNIC (http://www.alternic.net). Both of these organisations are independent of each other but show in the spirit of Internet that cooperation can be achieved. | “servers on a daily basis. Different organizations, including NSI, | operate the other 12 root servers. In total, the U.S. government plays” NSI does not operate the other twelve root servers. NSI is responsible for the operation of another twelve root servers associated with the IANA root server network. There are at least another fifteen root servers we know of that NSI does not operate. | “a direct role in the operation of half of the world's root servers.” It would be correct to say that half of the world’s IANA root servers as the US government plays no role in the administration and operation of the AURSC and affiliated ten root servers. | “Universal connectivity on the Internet cannot be guaranteed without a | set of authoritative and consistent roots.” We should also state that there are other networks of root servers capable of sharing authoritative data to ensure a consistent set of data be available to the public. NSI does not administer the .mil domain this data is transferred to NSI from an authoritative server not already included in the IANA root server network. | [[Page 8827]] | | “of organizing its technical functions need to evolve as well. The | pressures for change are coming from many different quarters: | There is widespread dissatisfaction about the absence of | competition in domain name registration. | Mechanisms for resolving conflict between trademark | holders and domain name holders are expensive and cumbersome.” The general feeling in the community at large is that a domain name, unless registered as a trademark in its entirety, does not constitute a trademark, with perhaps the exception of a TLD specifically for commercial entities, vanity or trademark policy. By rights commercial companies who trade do not qualify for the traditional .org TLD. Are we to say that a trade mark used for commercial purposes has precedence over a non- commercial entity that may share the same name. It is not uncommon for the same business name to be registered ( or not) in each of the Australian eight states to different people undertaking similar or different business activities. It is possible for one of these to hold a trademark, yet the others not infringe this right. The same could possibly be said for trademark registration in the USA. | “Without changes, a proliferation of lawsuits could lead to | chaos as tribunals around the world apply the antitrust law and | intellectual property law of their jurisdictions to the Internet. | Many commercial interests, staking their future on the | successful growth of the Internet, are calling for a more formal and | robust management structure. | An increasing percentage of Internet users reside outside | of the U.S., and those stakeholders want a larger voice in Internet | coordination.” The increasing of number Internet users outside of the USA not only want a larger voice but would like a voice to be actually heard. Currently unless you are from a billion dollar company in Australia with only interests and profit and shareholders the voices of ISPs and users alike is ignored. | “As Internet names increasingly have commercial value, the | decision to add new top-level domains cannot continue to be made on an | ad hoc basis by entities or individuals that are not formally | accountable to the Internet community.” With respect to entities or individuals not formally accountable it could be said the same for the producer of any product who is only accountable to themselves and the purchasers of the product so long as no law is broken. The Internet community is for all intents and purposes not only the driving market but also the consumer and is protected by Trade Practices laws within the country of origin. One could also question “the formal accountability of a person who operates a web site on the Internet as the operator is not with exception to the law accountable to anyone.” | “Accordingly, on July 2, 1997, the Department of Commerce issued a | Request for Comments (RFC) on DNS administration, on behalf of an | inter-agency working group previously formed to explore the appropriate | future role of the U.S. government in the DNS. The RFC solicited public | input on issues relating to the overall framework of the DNS system, | the creation of new top-level domains, policies for registrars, and | trademark issues. During the comment period, over 430 comments were | received, amounting to some 1500 pages.1” Mr. Adam Todd was formally notified that NTIA would not accept submissions from non-US citizens and thus was not able to respond to the above-mentioned RFC. It is hoped that this is not an example of how the not-for-profit corporation will operate | “We expect that this proposal will likely spark a lively debate, | requiring thoughtful analysis, and appropriate revisions. Nonetheless,” This document does not allow time nor does it provide a process for further revisions or comment periods if implementation is to commence in April 1998. | “we are hopeful that reasonable consensus can be found and that, after | appropriate modifications, implementation can begin in April, 1998. | Recognizing that no solution will win universal support, the U.S. | government seeks as much consensus as possible before acting.” As no solution will win universal support there must be a mechanism to which fair comment can be made in response to any process that is deemed authoritative by any one country or by any treaty. | V. Principles for a New System | | “Our consultations have revealed substantial differences among | Internet stakeholders on how the domain name system should evolve. | Since the Internet is changing so rapidly, no one entity or individual | can claim to know what is best for the Internet. We certainly do not | believe that our views are uniquely prescient. Nevertheless, shared | principles have emerged from our discussions with Internet | stakeholders.” We strongly agree with the bold section above. At no time has any member of our organisations made any claim or stated that they know the “best solution” to which end AURSC and AHNET have worked with other organisations internationally to produce a suitable result. The IAHC and CORE members unconditionally claim to be the solution backed only by a number of companies, small political organisations, and almost no Internet-user or the bulk of Internet-commerce support. Anyone who wishes to make a very quick dollar indemnified by stating your name may not be registered certainly does not hold the interests of the user or community at large. | B. Competition | | “The Internet succeeds in great measure because it is a | decentralized system that encourages innovation and maximizes | individual freedom. Where possible, market mechanisms that support | competition and consumer choice should drive the technical management | of the Internet because they will promote innovation, preserve | diversity, and enhance user choice and satisfaction.” We strongly agree with the above bold statements. Certainly this is happening now as users choose to use alternate root server data sources such as AURSC with over 600 ISPs who have consciously made the selection. The statement that begins “where possible” seems almost restrictive in that the market will adequately determine who does and does not survive. If one were to put protective measures in place for the domain name system to protect the portability or ability to use indefinitely a sub-level domain name why has the same procedure not been put in place to protect users who obtain email addresses from ISPs of which some go out of business leaving the user with a valueless non-working email address. | D. Representation | | “Technical management of the Internet should reflect the diversity | of its users and their needs. Mechanisms should be established to | ensure international input in decision making.” Does this mean that the not-for-profit corporation will have representation of all interests and factions of both users and commercial organisations world-wide? | “Similarly, coordination of the root server network is necessary if | the whole system is to work smoothly. While day-to-day operational | tasks, such as the actual operation and maintenance of the Internet | root servers, can be contracted out, overall policy guidance and | control of the TLDs and the Internet root server system should be | vested in a single organization that is representative of Internet | users.” Control is a very strong word and is the exact reason that we are in the process that we find ourselves in today. No one person or entity wishes any other to individually have control. If this organisation is to control the Internet root system one could enjoy the thought of the US government ensuring Henry Ford that there is only one motor vehicle. One would probably still crank-start their car today. If all the interests are vested into a single organisation this organisation could fall into the control of a single faction. Representation of the Internet cannot be possible represented by one or even a handful of organisations. As already stated there a numerous diverse interests from individual user, commercial entity, financial entity, several dozen religious entities, research entities, community entities. We are sure by now the point is understood. | [[Page 8828]] | | “1. To set policy for and direct the allocation of number blocks to | regional number registries for the assignment of Internet addresses; | 2. To oversee the operation of an authoritative root server system;” Point two tend to indicate either a single control of a single root server system or that the corporation will operate only one of many of authoritative root server systems such as the system provided by AURSC. | “3. To oversee policy for determining, based on objective criteria | clearly established in the new organization's charter, the | circumstances under which new top-level domains are added to the root | system; and” Currently there is no policy for adding TLDs. Had a policy been created at an appropriate time perhaps many of the problems of today would not need surface. Creating any policy and providing any legacy organisations a position of control, administration, or continued operation would not only be contentious but could jeopardise the investment and personal time invested into developing the domain name system. It is this investment by the likes of AURSC and AlterNIC that has lead to the commercial advancement and development of TLD name space. It should be recognised that AURSC in particular has invested over eighteen months of finance, research and development and voluntary staff into providing a choice for the consumer. This should be fair evidence that AURSC and AlterNIC have a historic place not only in provision of root server resources but commercial, TLDs and commercial policy associated with the TLDs. | “The new corporation will be funded by domain name registries and | regional IP registries. Initially, current IANA staff will move to this | new organization to provide continuity and expertise throughout the | period of time it takes to establish the new corporation” We first question the staff of IANA in their ability to provide unbiased continuity and expertise during the above-mentioned period. It is certainly no great secret that under IANA authority in February the 13 US government funded root servers were segmented causing minor discrepancies between the root servers. We also question on what basis will the funding for this corporation be calculated. If the funding is to come from domain name registries it is most likely that these organisations will be run in a community spirit and only funded by their registrars. Does this mean that the registries will be required to charge the registrars a significant annual fee (a licence or tax) to be collected and be paid to the corporation? AURSC provide root server resources to owner of TLDs. TLD owners are not directly permitted to run a registry. This is part of AURSC policy to ensure the consumer does not pay an extortion fee for a domain name. The IAHC does not operate in this manner, causing some people to pay $10 000 for a lucky chance domain name ticket to be drawn and maybe licensing that name to them. Where is the accountability? | “United States, and incorporated under U.S. law as a not-for-profit | corporation. It will, however, have and report to a board of directors | from around the world.” We feel that basing the corporation in the USA may disadvantage membership and participation from outside the USA. Or will part of the running costs of the corporation be used to convene meetings with its members? Clearly, currently there has been no proposal as to how this board of directors will be selected or the criteria by one which may apply. For the key stake-holders to fairly comment to allow a general consensus the corporation could not possible start within six months, allowing time for the key stake-holders to become familiar and comfortable with the concept. | “time. Nonetheless, the organization and its board must derive | legitimacy from the participation of key stakeholders. Since the” If the organisation is to be supported by key stake-holders one has to question who the key stake-holders are. It is felt that these key holders are not only those at the commercial level but unquestionably those at the user level. Certainly without the users there is no Internet. Cost increase to the users may deter new users and see old users depart from the Internet. We don’t see a commercial registry purchasing names from another competitor so clearly the stake-holders are first the individual users who bear the cost of the running of the Internet. Followed by the organisations that have, do and will in the future, provide services such as registry services to the end user. AHNET is a good example of an organisation devoted to providing services to both the consumer at no charge and other commercial organisations for small fees. | “Seven members designated by a membership association (to be | created) representing Internet users. At least one of those board seats | could be designated for an individual or entity engaged in non- | commercial, not-for-profit use of the Internet, and one for individual | end users. The remaining seats could be filled by commercial users, | including trademark holders.” We don’t believe the users can be represented fairly by one organisation. Currently in Australia ISOC-AU and EFA compete for the end user membership, yet effectively claim to be representative of all Internet users. Neither has a majority user membership. | “publicly available. Super-majority or even consensus requirements may | be useful to protect against capture by a self-interested faction. The” The IAHC./CORE could capture the board by way of a super majority and control the new corporation with minimal effort. It should be noted that the IAHC members main object is clearly financial reward. It is also clear the CORE members are only interested in financial gain. This is shown by many of the registrars accepting fees from $20.00 to as high as $10 000.00 for a domain name that is not even resolvable via alternate root serves. It is estimated that over one million dollars has been spent by the IAHC yet there is no accountability to the CORE members, yet alone the public who are the ultimate end users and are constantly mislead by the strong marketing of CORE registrars and the IAHC. | [[Page 8829]] | | “registration--the registrar function--should be competitive. There is | disagreement, however, over the wisdom of promoting competition at the | registry level.” Again we come back to Mr. Henry Ford who makes the only motor car. Some might say it would be unwise to introduce Holden, Mitsubishi and Toyota. Certainly some car manufacturers have come and gone but in general new manufacturers are constantly entering the market with what is essentially four wheels and a body. There is little difference if any where domain names are concerned. | “To choose among TLDs rather than face a single option. Competing TLDs | would seek to heighten their efficiency, lower their prices, and | provide additional value-added services. Investments in registries | could be recouped through branding and marketing. The efficiency, | convenience, and service levels associated with the assignment of names | could ultimately differ from one TLD registry to another. Without these | types of market pressures, they argue, registries will have very little | incentive to innovate.” We strongly agree and suggest that the market will be the pressure on most of these issues anyway. All markets internationally show very little tolerance to profiteering companies when there are alternatives. It has been clear of recent that the IAHC would not invest into cost-reducing procedures. It has let its membership charge from non-refundable amounts from $20 to $10 000 into a lottery draw which may not see the applicant receive their name. | “Others feel strongly, however, that if multiple registries are to | exist, they should be undertaken on a not-for-profit basis. They argue | that lack of portability among registries (that is, the fact that users | cannot change registries without adjusting at least part of their | domain name string) could create lock-in problems and harm consumers.” It is not likely a single registry of consumer credibility will operate only in an exclusive TLD. Most registries like most retail outlets will endeavour to provide as broad a range of product as possible. Two very good examples are AHNET and Netnames. | “For example, a registry could induce users to register in a top-level | domain by charging very low prices initially and then raise prices | dramatically, knowing that name holders will be reluctant to risk | established business by moving to a different top-level domain.” Although there is a question of prices increasing this is highly unlikely in such a volatile market where root server confederations could eliminate completely rogue TLD registries. Overall there is little difference between a user changing TLD as there is to a company changing physical address or even their phone numbers. | “We concede that switching costs and lock-in could produce the | scenario described above. On the other hand, we believe that market | mechanisms may well discourage this type of behaviour. On balance, we” We strongly agree and reiterate that the market will discourage any kind of profiteering behaviour. | C. The Creation of New gTLDs | | “Internet stakeholders disagree about who should decide when a new | top-level domain can be added and how that decision should be made. | Some believe that anyone should be allowed to create a top-level domain | registry. They argue that the market will decide which will succeed and | which will not. Others believe that such a system would be too chaotic | and would dramatically increase customer confusion. They argue that it” Confusion is already paramount in the domain name industry. The best example would currently be in Australia where initially commercials only had COM.AU. In late 1997 the registry responsible for NET.AU opened this space for anyone and everyone. To further add to the confusion AU.COM and AU.NU were introduced at the same time as INOZ.COM and INAU.COM. To quote a Microsoft trademark, “Where do you want to go today?” | “would be far more complex technically, because the root server system | would have to point to a large number of top-level domains that were | changing with great frequency. They also point out that it would be” There is no technical reason why this should be more complex or difficult. Currently SLDs are loaded into the root servers operated by NSI and IANA every three hours. The data is checked every fifteen minutes. A server that has TLDs being created and destroyed will bear no more load in real terms than any large DNS server carrying the same number of SLD zone files. AHNET hosts over 2000 individual zone files for Australian companies. These DNS servers are no more fancy than the typical desk-top PC. | “much more difficult for trademark holders to protect their trademarks | if they had to police a large number of top-level domains.” Trademark holders are only permitted to take action where the use of their trademark by an unauthorised party may dilute or consumer confusion in relation to that trademark. Certainly here when we enter a trademark name ninety seven percent of the time it is not found in the COM.AU zone file. The TLD COM is not an excuse for global commercial organisations to register their trademarks. Nor for that matter is it the right of a trademark holder to pursue a twelve year old child who in good faith was given the domain name POKEY.ORG (his nickname) as a birthday present. The child’s father purchased the domain name in good faith from NSI who at the time of writing this document were to place this name on hold because a company, the PREMA Toy company felt their trademark right was being infringed. Clearly the public opinion is that the trademark right is in no way being diluted or infringed. NSI was a government funded organisation at the time the current policy was put in place against overwhelming Internet community opinion. Is this an example of how registries will operate? Lead by example. | “Some have called for the creation of a more descriptive system of | top-level domains based on industrial classifications or some other | easy to understand schema. They suggest that having multiple top-level | domains is already confusing and that the addition of new generic TLDs | will make it more difficult for users to find the companies they are | seeking.” It is hard to imagine that more TLDs will cause confusion. Most people have at least two contact phone numbers, a work and a home phone number. Additionally, some have mobile, pager and even satellite numbers. There is no confusion as to how to contact a person by telephone or in this case by email or viewing a web site. Are we to say that trademark holders of one country will battle or have precedence over identical trademark holders from another country over a domain name? It is clear that although trademark is important clear boundaries need to be defined sooner rather than later to ensure that a global trademark claim doesn’t interfere with or hinder the development of the Internet. | “Market driven systems result in innovation and greater consumer | choice and satisfaction in the long run. We expect that in the future, | directory services of various sorts will make it easy for users to find | the sites they seek regardless of the number of top-level domains. | Attempts to impose too much central order risk stifling a medium like | the Internet that is decentralized by nature and thrives on freedom and | innovation.” Certainly companies have been innovating fro quite some time. The Finder series of web services produced by AHNET removed the need for the user to know what a domain name is to access a web site. This is done transparently in a recently developed protocol making Internet even friendlier. This is an example of innovation. | D. The Trademark Dilemma | | “It is important to keep in mind that trademark/domain name disputes | arise very rarely on the Internet today. NSI, for example, has | registered millions of domain names, only a tiny fraction of which have | been challenged by a trademark owner. But where a trademark is | unlawfully used as a domain name, consumers may be misled about the | source of the product or service offered on the Internet, and trademark | owners may not be able to protect their rights without very expensive | litigation.” Again we draw attention to POKEY.ORG where there is certainly no unlawful use of a trademark. | “On the other hand, management of the Internet must respond to the needs | of the Internet community as a whole, and not trademark owners | exclusively. The balance we strike is to provide trademark holders with | the same rights they have in the physical world, to ensure | transparency, to guarantee a dispute resolution mechanism with resort | to a court system, and to add new top-level domains carefully during | the transition to private sector coordination of the domain name | system.” Again we draw attention to POKEY.ORG where NSI at this time has indicated it will put on hold POKEY.ORG. This clearly violates both the Internet community response and that of the domain name owner. This is certainly not showing a balance of rights. Registrars or registries should not be responsible or be required to resolve the disputes of organisations caused by registration of a string of characters in a government database. The registrars and registries should have no participation in the dispute-resolution until such time that they are notified by final order of a court to retain or release or transfer title of the domain name. In the same way that a business name registered in one state does not involve the government registry body to stop a user using the same name in another state. | “its representative. To deter the pirating of domain names, the registry | could also require applicants to certify that it knows of no entity | with superior rights in the domain name it seeks to register.” It is already a requirement of applicants by most registries worldwide and also forms part of the policy that the applicant ensure that they are not breaching a trademark, company, or business name lawful right. | domain names, and how to contact a domain name holder. Many trademark | holders find the current registration search tool, who is, too limited | in its functioning to be effective for this purpose. A more robust and | flexible search tool, which features multiple field or string searching | and retrieves similar names, could be Such a resource already exists. Again we mention the Finder services provided by AHNET. | [[Page 8830]] | | employed or developed to meet the needs of trademark holders. The | databases also could be kept up to date by a requirement that domain | name registrants maintain up-to-date contact information. This is already a requirement of all registries. It is frequently the domain name holder who almost knowingly ensures that this data is not up-to-date. We have no recommendation as to how to improve this process. | We seek comment on whether registries should be required to resolve | disputes within a specified period of time after an opposition is | filed, and if so, how long that period should be. As we have already stated registries should only be required to await a settlement notice from both parties, or that as handed down by a court before the registry were able to make any changes to on-line data. The time limits and processes should only be limited to that of the disputing parties. | where the ``A'' root server is maintained. We seek comment on this | proposal, as well as suggestions for how such jurisdictional provisions | could be implemented. This seems to be an asking that all international or territorial laws be rescinded by the registries. We don’t believe that this would be an acceptable practise as it leaves the registries in a position where one minute they could claim one jurisdiction and later a different, more beneficial jurisdiction according to event or complaint. | Trademark holders have also called for the creation of some | mechanism for ``clearing'' trademarks, especially famous marks, across | a range of gTLDs. Such mechanisms could reduce trademark conflict | associated with the addition of new gTLDs. Again, we seek comment on | this proposal, and suggested mechanisms for trademark clearance | processes. Although this sounds like a very good idea and beneficial to trademark holders, the first question that comes to mind is their preparedness to pay and maintain their trademark in such a huge variety of TLDs, SLD, 3LDs, 4LDs. To which stage do we stop? The second question being, does the trademark holder of a trademark registered in New Zealand have the right to that domain name in the United States? If not, why not? | trademark infringement. Until case law is fully settled, however, | registries can expect to incur legal expenses in connection with | trademark disputes as a cost of doing business. These costs should not Case law is perhaps a cure rather than a prevention of the problem. It seems by your statements that your would rather let legal due course attempt to if at all resolve the problems of trademarks and domain names in a very expensive series of court battles that may extend beyond the boundaries of one country. Registries should not be expected to incur legal costs as a cost of doing business associated with the asset to which their business is derived. | be borne by the new not-for-profit corporation, and therefore | registries should be required to indemnify the new corporation for | costs incurred in connection with trademark disputes. The evolution of If the registry is able to be joined to the trademark dispute then clearly the not-for-profit corporation would also be joined on the basis that it had the authority and gave the authority to the registry to conduct business. We do not believe any company could legally indemnify and authority from being authoritative. A summary of comments is provided to the points below. | A number of steps must be taken to create the system envisioned in | this paper. | 1. The new not-for-profit organization must be established and its | board chosen. We see it being very difficult to establish this organisation and select its board, even an interim board that will receive consensus from the Internet community within the next twelve months. | 2. The membership associations representing (1) registries and | registrars, and (2) Internet users, must be formed. Producing associations to represent registries and registrars will be an extensive process as currently there is little commonality between the existing four or five factions. Where Internet users are concerned it may be possible to form a single world-wide association that represents the five common factions of the users. | 3. An agreement must be reached between the U.S. government and the | current IANA on the transfer of IANA functions to the new organization. We question the value of transferring IANA into a new organisation. It would appear that this means moving the burden of IANA into a private sector corporation where conditions and expectations are considerable different and will probably not be met by the current staff. | 4. NSI and the U.S. government must reach agreement on the terms | and conditions of NSI's evolution into one competitor among many in the | registrar and registry marketplaces. A level playing field for | competition must be established. NSI have already claimed on numerous occasions that they are a private company acting as a competitor on a level playing field. The US Government must clarify this position before any form of restructure can take place. Full disclosure of NSI and it’s operations should be made in fairness to the competition and the public. | 6. A process must be laid out for making the management of the root | server system more robust and secure, and, for transitioning that | management from U.S. government auspices to those of the new | corporation. We see no changes to the management of the root server system currently managed by IANA if the staff from IANA are transferred with the same or more responsibilities to the new corporation. | This proposal calls for the creation of up to five new registries, | each of which would be initially permitted to operate one new gTLD. As | discussed above, that number is large enough to provide valuable | information about the effects of adding new gTLDs and introducing | competition at the registry level, but not so large as to threaten the | stability of the Internet during this transition period. In order to | designate the new registries and gTLDs, IANA must establish equitable, | objective criteria and processes for selecting among a large number of | individuals and entities that want to provide registry services. | Unsuccessful applicants will be disappointed. As IANA is reference above we feel that IANA is therefore responsible for the creation of these five new gTLDs. This must mean that a policy to establish equitable and objective criteria will be created. This document and its responses do not, and have not discussed this policy. It may be better that in coordination with the existing three major root server confederations and the IAHC that all existing data be implemented. This will avoid any unsuccessful applicants, as there will be none, to be disappointed. The next level of interest will be the registrars. It would be better that IANA remain detached from the interaction between the registrars and the above-formed registries. This will ensure a very wide spread of registrars globally. The registries could then easily maintain and manage the fundamental databases used by the registries, enabling all data to be accessible by everyone. Using this basic concept there will be no known disappointments and also no single government intervention of the free commercial Internet, consumer-driven marketplace. | We have examined a number of options for recognizing the | development work already underway in the private sector. For example, | some argue for the provision of a ``pioneer preference'' or other grand | fathering mechanism to limit the pool of would-be registrants to those | who, in response to previous IANA requests, have already invested in | developing registry businesses. While this has significant appeal and | we do not rule it out, it is not an easy matter to determine who should | be in that pool. IANA would be exposed to considerable liability for We feel it is fairly easy to determine who should be in that pool as at this date there are only a small handful, perhaps ten, claimants of TLD space, who have aligned themselves with at least one of four service-operating organisations. These claimants would be the owners of the TLD name space they claim, who would then licence the use of the TLD to registrars. The registry would be one of the four current players such as AURSC, AlterNIC, IAHC (who already have selected their five TLDs and created a registrar process) and eDNS. Clearly this associated with NSI and careful coordination of IANA will resolve all disputes currently known in this marketplace and resolves the issue of pioneer preference and would also exempt IANA to exposure as all known participants will have entered formally into the marketplace at the same time. | such determinations, and required to defend against charges that it | acted in an arbitrary or inequitable manner. We welcome suggestions as | to whether the pool of applicants should be limited, and if so, on what | basis. We feel that further development on the above suggestions will avoid any limitation of applicants being necessary. From this point forward the market would decide who would and would not be successful. Any organisation that fell short would have its name space quickly grabbed by an affiliate organisation. | We propose, that during the transition, the first five entities | (whether from a limited or unlimited pool) to meet the technical, | managerial, and site requirements described in Appendix 1 will be | allowed to establish a domain name registry. The IANA will engage We feel that the term “will be allowed” is limiting some organisations from entering into what should appear to be a free and open marketplace. Overall the requirements of Appendix One are fairly reasonable, but it should be clearly noted that the costs for providing these services outside of the United States may be far greater than that of providing the service in the United States. If it is the intention of this process to limit registries to only operate within the United States then this is fair. If not, it restricts the ability for other participants outside of the United States to easily enter the market. Again IANA has been mentioned as the controlling body which may be biased towards some of the potential applicants. | to IANA. (We welcome suggestions on the gTLDs that should be | immediately available and would propose a list based on that input, as | well as any market data currently available that indicates consumer | interest in particular gTLDs.) The question of which gTLDs could be made immediately available will greatly depend on geographical location. It is clear that although the entire DNS debate appears to have arisen in the United States the exact same process is slowly unfolding within Australia. Where the IAHC and AlterNIC wish to compete with NSI we have in Australia ADNA and AURSC competing with the mish-mash of registries in COM.AU. AURSC released the top-level domain .AUS under licence and strict guidance to a marketing company the right to sell or provision names under COM.AUS and NET.AUS. Very few organisations in Australia are interested in names that do not clearly represent their location in Australia. As Australia is a fairly dominant player in the Internet it would be fair to suggest that a registry process be allocated to the Australian market. Our suggestion of course, is to provide this to AURSC on the basis that it currently has market share and the resources necessary to satisfy consumer demand. Note again that AURSC has direct input from ISPs and Internet users, although in most cases the final decision is left to the discretion of Mr. Adam Todd. Mr. Todd has indicated on numerous occasions that he does not wish to be the sole decision maker, but does ensure that full Internet community interests are put ahead of that of commercial interests. | C. The Root Server System | | IANA and the U.S. government, in cooperation with NSI, the IAB, and | other relevant organizations will undertake a review of the root server | system to recommend means to increase the security and professional | management of the system. The recommendations of the study should be | implemented as part of the transition process to the new corporation. We agree that the professional management of the root server system requires a review, and expansion and implementation of new protocols. One exceptionally fair method would be a coordinated effort between IANA, AURSC, AlterNIC and perhaps eDNS. By merging these resources to contain uniform data, not only do we again resolve the who- can and who-can’t problem but we inject considerable expertise, both technical and management, into the operation of this upper environment. This again resolves the current investment problem of the above-mentioned organisations and places everyone in a shared “Internet spirit” level playing field. | E. The Process | | The U.S. government recognizes that its unique role in the Internet | domain name system should end as soon as is practical. We also | recognize an obligation to end this involvement in a responsible manner | that preserves the stability of the Internet. We cannot cede authority | to any particular commercial interest or any specific coalition of | interest groups. We also have a responsibility to oppose any efforts to | fragment the Internet, as this would destroy one of the key factors-- | interoperability--that has made the Internet so successful. | Our goal is to seek as strong a consensus as possible so that a | new, open, and accountable system can emerge that is legitimate in the | eyes of all Internet stakeholders. It is in this spirit that we present | this paper for discussion. Although we strongly agree it would be fair to say that by encouraging the afore- mentioned root server networks and the already known TLD owners and registries to jointly enter the marketplace there will be no destruction of interpretability. In fact by taking this approach, not only is the entire process a win-win for all pioneering and invested interests but opens up the ability for a very large consensus to be created. | Appendix 1--Recommended Registry and Registrar Requirements | | requirements outlined below. Only prospective registries that meet | these criteria will be allowed by IANA to register their gTLD in the | ``A'' server. If, after it begins operations, a registry no longer | meets these requirements, IANA may transfer management of the domain | names under that registry's gTLD to another organization. Again, the administration is being directed to IANA and again we state that IANA historically has shown not only its inability to propose and create policy but also that its staff will break directive of their own free will. We strongly recommend that a member from IANA, a member from AURSC, a member from AlterNIC and a member from the IAHC be established as an interim coordinating group to ensure fair development. | Appendix 2--Minimum Dispute Resolution and Other Procedures Related to | Trademarks | | 1. Minimum Application Requirements. | a. Sufficient owner and contact information (eg., names, mail | address for service of process, e-mail address, telephone and fax | numbers, etc.) to enable an interested party to contact either the | owner/applicant or its designated representative; and a | b. Certification statement by the applicant that: | | --It is entitled to register the domain name for which it is | applying and knows of no entity with superior rights in the domain | name; and | --It intends to use the domain name. We feel this criteria meets our recommendation that any trademark dispute will not involve the registry or registrar by way that the applicant is accepting full responsibility. Trademark owners in this process must agree that the registrar and registries are not responsible for trademark infringement. It should be noted that a trademark owner of lesser value may one day also face this criteria and a dispute. | 2. Searchable Database Requirements. | a. Utilizing a simple, easy-to-use, standardized search | interface that features multiple field or string searching and the | retrieval of similar names, the following information must be | included in all registry databases, and available to anyone with | access to the Internet: The information required to be maintained by the registry is typical of that required to be maintained by any registry process, whether driver’s licence, motor vehicle, passport, etc. We agree with these requirements as a minimum. Further database information could be considered proprietary to the registry concerned. | 3. Updated Ownership, Contact and Use Information. | a. At any time there is a change in ownership, the domain name | owner must submit the following information: The change of ownership details form part of the conditions of registration licence to the domain name holder. It is expected that the owner will update their information. | 4. Alternative Dispute Resolution of Domain Name Conflicts. | a. There must be a readily available and convenient dispute | resolution process that requires no involvement by registrars. | b. Registries/Registrars will abide by the decisions resulting | from an agreed upon dispute resolution process or by the decision of | a court of competent jurisdiction. | If an objection to registration is raised within 30 days after | registration of the domain name, a brief period of suspension during | the pendency of the dispute will be provided by the registries. We have no disagreement with the process described in section 4. Joint Submission in response to the “US Green Paper” Mr. Adam Todd email at@ah.net Copyright © 1998 Adam Todd Page 1/1 Monday, 23 March 1998 AU-EST